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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DEEP FAKES, BOTS, AND SILOED JUSTICES: AMERICAN
ELECTION LAW IN A “POST-TRUTH” WORLD
RICHARD L. HASEN*
INTRODUCTION
About a decade or so ago, the major questions in the field of election law
were familiar to scholars and centered on the Supreme Court: Would the
Supreme Court overrule cases upholding limits on corporate and labor union
campaign spending in candidate elections? 1 Would the Court strike down a key
provision of the Voting Rights Act requiring jurisdictions with a history of racial
discrimination in voting to get federal approval before changing their voting
rules? 2 Would the Court rein in the use of strict voter identification laws, which
(mostly Republican 3) state legislatures imposed in the name of preventing voter
fraud and promoting voter confidence, but that opponents believed were a means
of suppressing the votes of those likely to vote for Democrats?
We all know how the Court answered those questions, with controversial
opinions in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 4 striking down the
corporate spending limits; Shelby County v. Holder, 5 killing a key provision of

* Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law. An earlier version
of this Essay was delivered as the Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture at St. Louis University
School of Law, October 11, 2019. Thanks to Guy Charles, Justin Levitt, and Dan Tokaji, who
offered thoughtful commentary on the lecture, to other symposium participants, and to Erwin
Chemerinsky, Bobby Chesney, Howard Gillman, Rebecca Green, Rick Pildes, Song Richardson,
Charlotte Stanton, Eugene Volokh, and Sonja West for useful comments and suggestions.
1. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (upholding key provisions
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, more commonly known as the “McCain-Feingold” law,
including those limiting corporate and union campaign spending on “electioneering
communications”), overruled in part by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310,
365 (2010); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 669 (1990), overruled by
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
2. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197–99 (2009) (questioning
the constitutionality of the formula in Section 4(b) of Voting Rights Act determining which
jurisdictions must obtain preclearance before making changes in their voting rules).
3. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS, 41–73 (2012).
4. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (holding unconstitutional under the First Amendment the
federal ban on spending corporate treasury funds on certain campaign activity in federal elections).
5. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013) (striking down as unconstitutional
under a principle of “equal sovereignty” the coverage formula contained in Section 4(b) of the
535
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the Voting Rights Act; and Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 6
allowing Indiana to enforce its strict voter identification law. And while issues
related to these cases continue to churn in the courts and remain of vital
importance to American democracy, 7 some of today’s most urgent election law
questions seem fundamentally different and less Court-centric than those of the
past, thanks to rapid technological change during a period of hyperpolarization
that has called into question the ability of people to separate truth from falsity.
These questions include: What can be done consistent with the First
Amendment and without raising the risk of censorship to ensure that voters can
make informed election decisions despite a flood of virally-spread false and
misleading speech, audio, and images? How can the United States minimize
foreign disinformation campaigns aimed at American elections and attempts to
sow social discord via bot armies? How can voters obtain accurate information
about who is trying to influence them via social media and other new forms of
technology? How can we expect judges to evaluate contested voting rights
claims when they, like others, may live in information cocoons in which the onesided media they consume affects their factual priors? Will voters on the losing
end of a close election trust vote totals and election results announced by election
officials when voters are bombarded with conspiracy theories about the
reliability of voting technology and when foreign adversaries target voting
systems to undermine confidence?
This Essay considers election law in the post-truth era, one in which it has
become increasingly difficult for voters to separate true from false information
relevant to election campaigns. As I have explained elsewhere, 8 rapid
technological change and the rise of social media have upended the traditional
Voting Rights Act). For a critique of this principle, see Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal
Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207 (2016).
6. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 185, 189–89, 204 (2008) (rejecting
facial constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause to Indiana’s strict voter
identification law).
7. On campaign finance, for example, the Court continues to consider the constitutionality
of other campaign finance limits in light of Citizens United. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 192 (2014). On voting rights, for example, courts continue to consider
whether jurisdictions should be “bailed in” to preclearance under Section 3 of the Voting Rights
Act. See Perez v. Abbott, 390 F. Supp. 3d 803, 807, 820 (W.D. Tex. 2019) (rejecting request to bail
in Texas despite finding of intentional racial discrimination by the state). On voter identification
laws, courts continue to struggle with whether strict voter identification laws violate Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act. See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 272 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (divided
Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc upholds district court finding that Texas voter identification law
violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017); Veasey v. Abbott,
888 F.3d 792, 795–96 (5th Cir. 2018) (divided Fifth Circuit panel rejects district court order
enjoining Texas voter identification law based upon finding of racially discriminatory purpose in
passing the law).
8. Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy), 16
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200 (2018) [hereafter Hasen, Cheap Speech].
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media’s business model and radically changed how people communicate,
educate, and persuade. The decline of the traditional media as information
intermediaries has transformed—and coarsened—social and political
communication, making it easier for misinformation and vitriol to spread. The
result? Political campaigns that increasingly take place under conditions of voter
mistrust and groupthink, with the potential for foreign interference and domestic
political manipulation via new and increasingly sophisticated technological
tools. Such dramatic changes raise deep questions about the conditions of
electoral legitimacy and threaten to shake the foundation of democratic
governance.
Part II of this Essay briefly describes what I mean by the “post-truth” era in
politics. Part III examines the effects of the post-truth era on campaign law,
arguing for a new law requiring social media to label as “altered” synthetic
media, including so-called “deep fakes.” I defend such a law as necessary to
support the government’s compelling interest in assuring voters have access to
truthful political information. Part IV considers campaign finance law, arguing
for campaign disclosure laws requiring those who use online and social media
to influence voters, including those using bots and other new technology, to
disclose their true identities and the sources and amounts of their spending. Part
V considers the difficulty of using courts to adjudicate voting rights claims when
there is fundamental disagreement about the basic facts related to issues such as
voter fraud in our hyperpolarized, cocooned political environment. The Essay
concludes with some thoughts on whether election law is up to the task of
dealing with technological change and polarization that threaten some of the key
suppositions of how democracy is intended to function, including as an aid to
the peaceful transition of power.
II. THE “POST-TRUTH” ERA IN POLITICS
To start with definitions: When I say we are living in a “post-truth” era in
the United States, 9 I do not mean there is no such thing as objective truth. Far
from it. I mean we are living in a time when there is fundamental disagreement
among members of the public regarding basic facts about the state of the world,
and there is no generally accepted arbiter whom a broad spectrum of the public
will rely upon to resolve public factual disputes. Emotions often drive views
9. I do not mean to suggest that the post-truth era exists only in the United States. This may
well be a more global phenomenon, but that question is beyond the scope of this Essay. Bobby
Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and
National Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1753, 1786 n.139 (2019) (“The Edelman Trust Barometer,
which measures trust in institutions around the world, recorded a drop of nine points in the Trust
Index for the United States from 2017 to 2018. Even among the informed public, the US dropped
from a Trust Index of 68 to 45.”). See also Lori A. Ringhand, First Amendment
(Un)Exceptionalism: A Comparative Taxonomy of Campaign Finance Reform Proposals in the US
and UK (July 19, 2019) (unpublished draft) (on file with the author).
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more than evidence, 10 trust is in decline, and views commonly divide along
partisan and ideological lines. Social media amplifies partisanship, raising
emotions and concomitantly hardening positions about facts. And the public
increasingly recognizes that “basic facts,” and not just opinion, are at stake. 11
For example, on climate change, a Pew Research Center survey found that
“[t]hree-quarters of Democrats (including independents who lean to the
Democratic Party) said in 2018 that the Earth is warming mostly due to human
activity. In contrast, only about one-quarter of Republicans (26%, including
leaners) said the same.” 12 Further,
[i]n 2016, 93% of Democrats (including leaners) with a high level of knowledge
about science said climate change is mostly due to human activity, compared
with 49% of Democrats with low science knowledge, based on a nine-item
index. By contrast, Republicans and GOP-leaning independents with a high
level of scientific knowledge were no more likely than those with a low level of
knowledge to say climate change is mostly due to human activity. 13

On the question of Russian interference in the 2016 elections, a Washington
Post-Schar School survey found that “[a]n 83 percent majority of Democrats say
the Russian government tried to influence the election; a 54 percent majority of
Republicans say Russia did not try to influence the vote.”14 And on immigration,
42 percent of Republicans say that undocumented immigrants are more likely
than U.S. citizens to commit serious crimes compared to 46 percent who say
they are not. 15
The causes for the rise of the post-truth era are beyond the scope of this
project. But roughly speaking, this era arose thanks to an unlucky confluence of
10. The Cambridge English Dictionary defines “post-truth” as “relating to a situation in which
people are more likely to accept an argument based on their emotions and beliefs, rather than one
based on facts.” Post-truth, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictio
nary/english/post-truth [https://perma.cc/2NXM-54UM] (last visited July 3, 2019).
11. In Presidential Contest Voters Say ‘Basic Facts’ Not Just Policies Are in Dispute, PEW
RES. CTR. (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.people-press.org/2016/10/14/in-presidential-contest-voters
-say-basic-facts-not-just-policies-are-in-dispute/ [https://perma.cc/S66J-XWPL].
12. Cary Funk & Brian Kennedy, How Americans See Climate Change in 5 Charts, FACT
TANK, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/19/howamericans-see-climate-change-in-5-charts/ [https://perma.cc/BZ3U-4F9A].
13. Id.
14. Scott Clement & Karoun Demirjian, Mueller Report Findings Upend Partisan Views of
Probe Poll Finds, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
mueller-report-findings-upend-partisan-views-of-probe-poll-finds/2019/03/30/55058c98-51b2-11
e9-88a1-ed346f0ec94f_story.html [https://perma.cc/6DNA-VFMK].
15. Shifting Public Views on Legal Immigration into the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (June 28, 2018),
https://www.people-press.org/2018/06/28/shifting-public-views-on-legal-immigration-into-theu-s/ [https://perma.cc/Y6FH-68CN]. For a summary of the empirical evidence on this question, see
Robert Farley, Is Illegal Immigration Linked to More or Less Crime?, FACTCHECK.ORG (June 27,
2018), https://www.factcheck.org/2018/06/is-illegal-immigration-linked-to-more-or-less-crime/
[https://perma.cc/V7Z5-422X].
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two different phenomena: the hyperpolarization of our politics, 16 in which the
two major political parties have become more homogenous and ideologically
distinct along a liberal-conservative axis; and the decline in trusted
intermediaries, especially the news media, who had helped people to separate
truth from fiction. In Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American
Democracy), 17 I explain how technology’s transformation to allow cheap
speech, such as social media posts, “usher[ed] in radical new opportunities for
readers, viewers, and listeners to custom design what they read, see, and hear,
while concomitantly undermining the power of intermediaries including
publishers and bookstore owners.” 18 But this transformation killed the
economics of the traditional news media business, and despite the
democratization of speech, the rise of cheap speech has had a definite dark side,
with truth as one of the primary casualties:
No doubt cheap speech has increased convenience, dramatically lowered the
costs of obtaining information, and spurred the creation and consumption of
content from radically diverse sources. But the economics of cheap speech also
have undermined mediating and stabilizing institutions of American democracy
including newspapers and political parties, with negative social and political
consequences. In place of media scarcity, we now have a media fire hose which
has diluted trusted sources of information and led to the rise of “fake news”—
falsehoods and propaganda spread by domestic and foreign sources for their own
political and pecuniary purposes. The demise of local newspapers sets the stage
for an increase in corruption among state and local officials. Rather than
democratizing our politics, cheap speech appears to be hastening the irrelevancy
of political parties by facilitating the ability of demagogues to secure support
from voters by appealing directly to them, sometimes with incendiary appeals.
Social media also can both increase intolerance and overcome collective action
problems, both allowing for peaceful protest but also supercharging polarization
and raising the dangers of violence in the United States. 19

The status of the news business has further deteriorated since I wrote the
Cheap Speech article. Between January and May of 2019, approximately 3000
American journalists were laid off or offered a buyout. 20 These latest losses are
on top of a tremendous decline in the industry as a whole, with journalism falling
off twenty-three percent from 2008 to 2017, 21 and by sixty-five percent looking
16. The best explanation for the causes of our current period of hyperpolarization appears in
Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in
America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273 (2011).
17. Hasen, Cheap Speech, supra note 8, at 201.
18. Id. at 200.
19. Id.
20. Gerry Smith, Journalism Job Cuts Haven’t Been This Bad Since the Recession,
BLOOMBERG (July 1, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles/2019-07-01/journal
ism-layoffs-are-at-the-highest-level-since-last-recession [https://perma.cc/C442-HR2B].
21. Id.
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over the last two decades. 22 Indeed journalists have lost their jobs at a faster rate
in that period than coal miners. 23
Social media and polarization act synergistically in a detrimental way. A
recent experimental study by Michael Thaler found that people overestimate the
truth of news reports that are in line with their preexisting beliefs, discount those
that are contrary to those beliefs, and are overconfident in their ability to tell true
from false statements. 24
Of course, the post-truth era creates many dangers for different aspects of
society. For example, if enough people do not believe that humans caused
climate change and need to fix it, there could be detrimental environmental
consequences. The ability to spread false images of world leaders can imperil
national security. 25
My focus here is on the serious implications of the post-truth era for
elections and American democracy. Political science models do not expect
voters to be busily studying policy all day, but they do posit that voters are able
to have enough access to the truth via reliable shortcuts and intermediaries to
figure out what is going on and to make decisions consistent with their
interests. 26 The post-truth era undermines that supposition for a vibrant
democracy. 27
22. John Bonazzo, Despite Trump Rhetoric Journalists Are Losing Jobs at a Faster Rate than
Coal Miners, THE OBSERVER (Oct. 23, 2018), https://observer.com/2018/10/jobs-trump-coalminers-journalism/ [https://perma.cc/J7SQ-A67S].
23. Id.
24. Michael Thaler, The “Fake News” Effect: An Experiment on Motivated Reasoning and
Trust in News 29 (Nov. 1, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://scholar.harvard.edu
/files/mthaler/files/mthaler_fake-news-effect.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EL7Y-U8V6]
(“Subjects
substantially over-trust Pro-Party news and Fake News in an environment with uninformative
signals, real monetary stakes, and little room for self-deception. Furthermore, political partisans of
all demographics engage in motivated reasoning, suggesting that this is a widespread bias. This
bias leads to other errors and biases such as over-trust in Fake News, underperformance, and
overconfidence.”). But see Katherine Clayton et al., Partisan Motivated Reasoning and
Misinformation in the Media: Is News from Ideological Uncongenial Sources More Suspicious?,
JAPANESE J. POL. SCI. (forthcoming), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/japanese-journalof-political-science/article/partisan-motivated-reasoning-and-misinformation-in-the-media-isnews-from-ideologically-uncongenial-sources-more-suspicious/BCD0B8E0558FD72E8A3E093
1FCB4E35A# [https://perma.cc/FZL9-7S39] (finding that people tend to believe false information
when they are exposed to it, regardless of whether it is from an ideologically compatible source).
25. Chesney & Citron, supra note 9, at 1783.
26. Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Why Are American Campaign Polls So Variable When
Votes are So Predictable?, 23 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 409 (1993) (positing that during the campaign
period, voters receiving information through the media helps them to make decisions consistent
with their enlightened self-interest). For a brief review of the literature on how campaigns affect
voter choice, see DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS 674–
79 (6th ed. 2017).
27. See Nathaniel Persily, The Internet’s Challenge to Democracy: Framing the Problem and
Assessing Reform 22–23 (2019), available at https://storage.googleapis.com/kofiannanfoundation.
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And so, I now turn to my key question: What, if anything, can and should
election law do to ameliorate the problems for American democracy caused by
the post-truth era?
III. CAMPAIGN LAW
It was the ultimate October surprise, actually back-to-back surprises, in the
2016 presidential election between Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton and
Republican candidate Donald Trump. On October 7, 2016, the Washington Post
revealed the “Access Hollywood” tape. The Post described the leaked video as
one in which
Donald Trump bragged in vulgar terms about kissing, groping and trying to have
sex with women during a 2005 conversation caught on a hot microphone, saying
that “when you’re a star, they let you do it.” The video captures Trump talking
with Billy Bush, then of “Access Hollywood,” on a bus with the show’s name
written across the side. They were arriving on the set of “Days of Our Lives” to
tape a segment about Trump’s cameo on the soap opera. 28

The video led to immediate condemnation from people across the political
spectrum and predictions of the Trump campaign’s collapse. Yet the campaign
did not collapse. One reason for Trump’s survival may have been what came
right after the tape leaked. According to Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s
investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 elections, “[l]ess than an hour
after the video’s publication, WikiLeaks released the first set of emails stolen by
[agents of a Russian army unit known as] the GRU from the account of Clinton
campaign chairman John Podesta.” 29 After embarrassing material surfaced in
the Podesta emails and from other stolen materials, Trump went on to narrowly
beat Clinton in the election.
Trump was “extremely upset” about the “Access Hollywood” tape,
according to his former aide, Hope Hicks. 30 And yet after issuing a rare apology
org/2019/02/a6112278-190206_kaf_democracy_internet_persily_single_pages_v3.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/A97Z-72PX].
28. David A. Farenthold, Trump Recorded Having Extremely Lewd Conversation About
Women in 2005, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumprecorded-having-extremely-lewd-conversation-about-women-in-2005/2016/10/07/3b9ce776-8cb
4-11e6-bf8a-3d26847eeed4_story.html?utm_term=.13108edfa3b6 [https://perma.cc/W2RP-TQ
TQ]. (The most salacious comments in the conversation between Trump and “Access Hollywood”
host Billy Bush included: “And when you’re a star, they let you do it,” Trump says. “You can do
anything.” “Whatever you want,” says another voice, apparently Bush’s. “Grab them by the p—y,” Trump says. “You can do anything.”)
29. SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 58 (Mar. 2019) (hereafter,
MUELLER REPORT).
30. Id. at 79 (“The President then told Sessions he should resign as Attorney General. Sessions
agreed to submit his resignation and left the Oval Office. Hicks saw the President shortly after
Sessions departed and described the President as being extremely upset by the Special Counsel’s

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

542

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:535

one day following the video’s release, 31 Trump did something
extraordinaryhe suggested the video was fake. The New York Times reported
that Trump told a senator and an advisor a year after his apology that the tape
was not authentic, further telling the senator that he was looking to hire someone
to ascertain whether or not it was his voice on the tape. 32
It is hard to know if anyone who was paying attention to the controversy
believed Trump’s denials: after all, people know what they saw and heard. Even
Trump’s press secretary at the time, Sarah Sanders, would not weigh in to defend
him. 33 However, there is good reason to believe that future candidates in
Trump’s position will be luckier.
As technology improves, it is quickly getting easier, even for those without
great technical sophistication, to use artificial intelligence technology to create
synthetic media (more commonly known as “deep fakes”). Such audio and video
clips can be manipulated using machine learning and artificial intelligence and
can make a politician, celebrity, or anyone else appear to say or do anything that
the manipulator wants. 34 Within a few years, any politician could be made to
appointment. Hicks said that she had only seen the President like that one other time, when the
Access Hollywood tape came out during the campaign.”) (footnotes omitted).
31. Chris Cillizza, Here’s What Donald Trump Really Meant When He Apologized Friday
Night, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/08/
donald-trump-finally-apologized-for-his-lewd-remarks-here-it-is/?utm_term=.66b03fc19d38
[https://perma.cc/G8W2-83D2] (“I’ve never said I’m a perfect person, nor pretended to be someone
that I’m not. I’ve said and done things I regret, and the words released today on this more than a
decade old video are one of them. Anyone who knows me knows these words don’t reflect who I
am. I said it, I was wrong, and I apologize.”).
32. Emily Stewart, Trump Has Started Suggesting The Access Hollywood Tape is Fake. It’s
Not, VOX (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/11/28/16710130/trumpsays-access-hollywood-tape-fake [https://perma.cc/L5T4-26GN]; Jonathan Martin, Maggie
Haberman, and Alexander Burns, Why Trump Stands by Roy Moore, Even as It Fractures His
Party, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/25/us/politics/trump-roymoore-mcconnell-alabama-senate.html [https://perma.cc/UDS9-RSC9]. Trump apparently has
never publicly made the claim that the tape was fake.
33. Stewart, supra note 32 (quoting Sarah Sanders: “Look, the president addressed this. This
was litigated and certainly answered during the election by the overwhelming support for the
president and the fact that he’s sitting here in the Oval Office today.”).
34. Chesney & Citron, supra note 9, at 1758 (explaining that deep fake technology “leverages
machine-learning algorithms to insert faces and voices into video and audio recordings of actual
people and enables the creation of realistic impersonations out of digital whole-cloth. The end result
is realistic-looking video or audio making it appear that someone said or did something. Although
deep fakes can be created with the consent of people being featured, more often they will be created
without it.”); see also CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, SUMMARY OF JUNE 19TH
MEETING ON SAFEGUARDING THE U.S. 2020 ELECTION FROM SYNTHETIC AND MANIPULATED
MEDIA n.1 (July 2019) (on file with the author) (“We define synthetic media as audio, video, or
image generated with artificial intelligence that depicts someone saying or doing something they
neither said nor did. Manipulated media is audio, video, or image that depicts someone saying or
doing something they neither said nor did without the aid of artificial intelligence.”); Rebecca
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appear to say the odious words on the “Access Hollywood” tape, and that content
could spread virally via Facebook, Twitter, and other social media. We will no
longer be able to trust what we see and hear.
As Professor Brendan Nyhan has argued, 35 the primary danger of current
(lower-tech-driven) misinformation spread via social media is not that people
will necessarily believe false information and make decisions based upon it; but
that people will discount the veracity of all information based on the potential
for it to be false. 36 This trend will likely only increase as deep fakes improve in
technical sophistication and it becomes harder for humans to differentiate true
from false images without technical help. The effect also seems likely to be more
pronounced among younger people, who are more prone to be suspect of the
veracity of content. 37 Nyhan also worries that false videos might have more
serious effects than false written statements given how human cognition
works. 38
The situation with synthetic media creates something akin to what Nobel
Prize-winning economist George Akerlof described as the “market for lemons”
effect. 39 Akerlof’s theory explained problems with the proper functioning of a
market for used cars, when people have a difficult time differentiating between
a good used car and a bad oneor a “lemon.” In the market, good used cars are
less likely to remain for sale because everyone discounts what they will pay for
a used car by the chances that it is a lemon. This information problem creates a
spiraling down effect, where people with good used cars take them off the

Green, Counterfeit Campaign Speech, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1445, 1447–48 (2019) (using label of
“counterfeit” campaign speech for “a faked version of the real thing fabricated with the intent to
deceive”).
35. Brendan Nyhan, Why Fears of Fake News Are Overhyped, MEDIUM (Feb. 4, 2018),
https://medium.com/s/reasonable-doubt/why-fears-of-fake-news-are-overhyped-2ed9ca0a52c9
[https://perma.cc/V877-RKCD]; see also Andrew Guess et al., Selective Exposure to
Misinformation: Evidence From the Consumption of Fake News During the 2016 Presidential
Campaign, EUR. RES. COUNCIL (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/fake-news
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G8D-HAXN].
36. Max Read, Can You Spot a Deepfake? Does It Matter?, N.Y. MAG. (June 27, 2019),
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/06/how-do-you-spot-a-deepfake-it-might-not-matter.html
[https://perma.cc/MT4P-539R] (“If you want a vision of the future, don’t imagine an onslaught of
fake video. Imagine an onslaught of commenters calling every video fake.”).
37. Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Media Trust Continues to Recover from 2016 Low, GALLUP (Oct.
12, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/243665/media-trust-continues-recover-2016-low.aspx
[https://perma.cc/BJ45-PP7Q] (“53% of those aged 65 and older trust in the media, compared with
just 33% of those under age 30. Younger adults have come of an age in an era marked by partisan
media and fake news, while older Americans’ trust may have been established long ago in an era
of widely read daily newspapers and trusted television news anchors.”).
38. Nyhan, supra note 35.
39. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 489 (Aug. 1970).
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market because the price is too low, leading to more lemons on the market and
greater depression of the price.
Here too, the market for information from reputable news organizations will
suffer with the flood of plausible fake information: bad information crowds out
the good information as people are willing to pay less for all information given
the increased chances of receiving false information. 40
Further, the proliferation of artificial intelligence-generated deep fakes
would allow a future Donald Trump to take advantage of what Professors Bobby
Chesney and Danielle Citron have called the “Liar’s Dividend”: the decreasing
possibility that any image of a politician or celebrity is genuine “makes it easier
for liars to avoid accountability for things that are in fact true.” 41 As Trump has
said in the context of sexual harassment allegations, the strategy is “deny, deny,
deny.” 42 Denial becomes easier as bad information increasingly floods the
market.
Social media platforms do not yet know how to deal with the arrival of deep
fakes. Facebook flags some ordinary misinformation (such as a post falsely
stating that President Obama was born in Kenya) as false, and sometimes the
company demotes posts containing misinformation in users’ feeds and makes
fact check information available to those who click on links flagged as
containing false information. 43 However, Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook founder
and CEO, told an audience at the Aspen Ideas Festival in the summer of 2019
that perhaps the company should treat deep fakes differently from regular
misinformation. He gave no indication as to the precise nature of the different
handling, other than to say that the company was “evaluating” the issue.
Elsewhere in the interview, Zuckerberg suggested government action and

40. The rise of used car intermediaries such as CarMax and the cheaper spread of information
over the internet have somewhat solved the market failure for used cars. But we have not yet seen
a market solution to deal with problems of the easy spread of misinformation.
41. Chesney & Citron, supra note 9, at 1758; see also Samantha Cole, We Are Truly Fucked:
Everyone Is Making AI-Generated Fake Porn Now, MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 24, 2018), https://mother
board.vice.com/en_us/article/bjye8a/reddit-fake-porn-app-daisy-ridley [https://perma.cc/RN69-U
97V].
42. Maya Openheim, Donald Trump Says ‘You’ve Got to Deny’ Accusations by Women,
According to Bob Woodward Book, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.indepen
dent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-women-bob-woodward-deny-sexual-assaultstormy-daniels-book-fear-a8534061.html [https://perma.cc/G4TM-XEM7] (“‘You’ve got to deny,
deny, deny and push back on these women,’ Mr. Trump said, according to Mr. Woodward. ‘If you
admit to anything and any culpability, then you’re dead. That was a big mistake you made.’”).
43. See Daniel Funke, In the Past Year Facebook Has Quadrupled Its Fact Checking Partners,
POYNTER (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2019/in-the-past-year-facebook
-has-quadrupled-its-fact-checking-partners/ [https://perma.cc/57JU-7ZDU].
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regulation may be the answer to some of the company’s problems with attempted
political manipulation on the company’s platforms. 44
Does election law provide an avenue for preventing the erosion of truth
through misinformation and synthetic media? The question is urgent given that
about three-quarters of Americans in a recent survey favored steps to restrict
altered videos and images, with Democrats and Republicans similarly
supporting restrictions over freedom to publish such images. 45
I begin with the idea that any law purporting to regulate the content of media
being used for political communications would be subject to heightened First
Amendment scrutiny, 46 either strict scrutiny in which the government would
have to show that any regulation satisfied a compelling interest and that the
means adopted were narrowly tailored to that interest, or some intermediate level
of scrutiny. For this reason, there are limits to how much the law can help to
solve these problems with our democracy.
The compelling interest portion of the argument for regulation of false
media is surprisingly easy to make. Courts should recognize that the government
has a compelling interest in assuring that voters have access to truthful political
information and to the tools to discover its truth or falsity. The Supreme Court
has long recognized the value of an “active, alert” citizenry, 47 and democracy
depends upon voters’ ability to evaluate arguments in order to make political
and electoral decisions. As the Supreme Court stated in Citizens United, quoting
44. Barbara Ortutay, Zuckerberg Says Company Evaluating ‘Deep Fake’ Policy, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (June 26, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/506bfacda55540e1921a2dd101926fdf
[https://perma.cc/3E99-F89J]. The video of the portion of the exchange about deep fakes begins at
16:10 here: https://www.aspenideas.org/sessions/mark-zuckerberg-at-aspen-ideas-festival-2019
[https://perma.cc/RX48-3A7Y].
45. Jeffrey Gottfried, About Three-Quarters of Americans Favor Steps to Restrict Altered
Videos and Images, PEW RES. CTR. (June 14, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019
/06/14/about-three-quarters-of-americans-favor-steps-to-restrict-altered-videos-and-images/
[https://perma.cc/G24M-UKUN].
46. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015) (“it is well established that the First
Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular
viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.”); commercial speech is
subject to an intermediate standard of scrutiny, and here government efforts to require business
entities to tell the truth are likely on firmer constitutional footing. CTIA v. City of Berkeley, 928
F.3d 832, 842 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 658 (2019) (“Under Zauderer [v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)] as we interpret it today,
the government may compel truthful disclosure in commercial speech as long as the compelled
disclosure is reasonably related to a substantial governmental interest, and involves ‘purely factual
and uncontroversial information’ that relates to the service or product provided.”) (cleaned up); see
also infra footnotes 75–80 and accompanying text (considering the reach of Zauderer).
47. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 768–69 (1978) (“Preserving the integrity
of the electoral process, preventing corruption, and sustaining the active, alert responsibility of the
individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government are interests of the highest
importance”) (cleaned up).
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its seminal 1976 campaign finance decision, Buckley v. Valeo, “[i]n a republic
where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed
choices among candidates for office is essential.” 48 Further, the Court in New
York Times v. Sullivan 49 famously held that the state can punish those who
engage in false, defamatory speech made with actual malice.
The problem with a law regulating deep fakes or other false information
instead is one of the means to achieve the compelling interest. There is no easy
way for the government to define what counts as truthful political information,
and the process of mandating that the government police truth and falsity raises
dangers of viewpoint discrimination and government manipulation. Again, we
need look no further than President Trump, who routinely labels reporting he
does not like as “fake news,” 50 even when the reporting follows ordinary
journalistic standards and reasonable observers believe it to contain only truthful
information. Any government agency charged with separating true from false
information that is under the control of a Trump-like leader could manipulate
the process of declaring falsity. The cure would be worse than the disease.
However, this does not mean that all regulation to help voters discern truth
from lies is unconstitutional. The matter is complicated and gets us into a tangle
of some First Amendment doctrines.
To begin with, the Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on laws regulating
synthetic media created to influence elections or politics. The Court has,
however, moved from a position that false political speech made with actual
malice can be penalized toward a position very skeptical of such laws. In a 1982
case, Brown v. Hartlage, 51 the Court rejected an attempt to declare an election
result void after the winner was accused of violating a Kentucky law that barred
a candidate from certain corrupt practices. 52 The candidate had promised not to
take a salary if elected and Kentucky courts had previously held that promises
not to take a salary violated the statute and could be grounds for voiding the
election. 53 In the course of holding the Kentucky law unconstitutional, the Court
in dicta stated that “demonstrable falsehoods are not protected by the First
Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements.” 54

48. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976)).
49. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
50. Hasen, Cheap Speech, supra note 8, at 208.
51. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 58 (1982). The discussion in the next few paragraphs
draws from Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 74
MONT. L. REV. 53, 58, 65–68 (2013).
52. Brown, 456 U.S. at 58.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 60. The statement was dicta because there was no evidence in this case that the
candidate made the statement in anything other than good faith.
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By 2012, however, the Court appeared to have shifted its view on the
protection of false political speech. It strongly suggested in United States v.
Alvarez, 55 a case involving a person who lied about receiving a Medal of Valor
for bravery in combat, that laws penalizing false political speech would violate
the First Amendment.
There was no majority opinion. Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion for four
Justices rejected the argument that the First Amendment categorically does not
protect false statements, just as the First Amendment categorically does not
protect other types of speech, such as obscenity and fighting words. 56 He wrote
that “counterspeech” is normally the constitutionally acceptable response to
false political speech and that the Stolen Valor Act violated the First
Amendment. 57 Justice Breyer, in a concurring opinion for himself and Justice
Kagan, applied intermediate scrutiny in agreeing the Stolen Valor Act was
unconstitutional. 58 Importantly, Justice Breyer recognized that laws punishing
false political speech raised difficult questions of balancing, and that
counterspeech was the usual appropriate remedy. 59
Even Justice Alito, dissenting on the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor
law, argued that
there are broad areas in which any attempt by the state to penalize purportedly
false speech would present a grave and unacceptable danger of suppressing

55. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 713, 729–30 (2012).
56. Id. at 720–22.
57. Id. at 726–27.
58. Id. at 730 (Breyer, J. concurring in the judgment).
59. Justice Breyer wrote:
I recognize that in some contexts, particularly political contexts, such a narrowing will not
always be easy to achieve. In the political arena a false statement is more likely to make a
behavioral difference (say, by leading the listeners to vote for the speaker) but at the same
time criminal prosecution is particularly dangerous (say, by radically changing a potential
election result) and consequently can more easily result in censorship of speakers and their
ideas. Thus, the statute may have to be significantly narrowed in its applications. Some
lower courts have upheld the constitutionality of roughly comparable but narrowly tailored
statutes in political contexts. See, e.g., United We Stand America, Inc. v. United We Stand,
America New York, Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 93 (C.A.2 1997) (upholding against First Amendment
challenge application of Lanham Act to a political organization); Treasurer of the
Committee to Elect Gerald D. Lostracco v. Fox, 150 Mich. App. 617, 389 N.W.2d 446
(1986) (upholding under First Amendment statute prohibiting campaign material falsely
claiming that one is an incumbent). Without expressing any view on the validity of those
cases, I would also note, like the plurality, that in this area more accurate information will
normally counteract the lie. And an accurate, publicly available register of military awards,
easily obtainable by political opponents, may well adequately protect the integrity of an
award against those who would falsely claim to have earned it. And so it is likely that a
more narrowly tailored statute combined with such information-disseminating devices will
effectively serve Congress’ end.
Id. at 738 (citation omitted).
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truthful speech. Laws restricting false statements about philosophy, religion,
history, the social sciences, the arts, and other matters of public concern would
present such a threat. The point is not that there is no such thing as truth or falsity
in these areas or that the truth is always impossible to ascertain, but rather that
it is perilous to permit the state to be the arbiter of truth . . . . 60

Putting the three Alvarez opinions together, we see a Court unanimously
expressing deep skepticism of laws penalizing false speech in political
campaigns. Despite Alvarez, however, the Court has left room for some
regulation in related areas.
First, the government likely could prohibit what I will term false election
speech, which is false speech about the mechanics of voting. In Minnesota
Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 61 the Court acknowledged that the government could
ban false speech about when and how to vote, such as false speech directing
people to the wrong polling place, at least in a nonpublic forum like a polling
place. Under Mansky, the government may punish those who engage in such
speech. Such speech does not raise the risk of the state having to make judgment
calls about truth or falsity. For example, the location of a polling place is
objectively verifiable.
Further, although Mansky did not reach the issue, the government likely
could require websites and platforms with large numbers of users, such as major
social media companies, to remove false election speech from their sites. 62 Such
regulation does not raise the risk of censoring controversial political ideas. If the
law mandates that voting take place on Tuesday, a false social media post saying
“Democrats vote on Wednesday” is demonstrably false and requires no value
judgment on behalf of a government regulator and raises no issues of
ambiguity. 63
60. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 751–52 (Alito, J., dissenting).
61. Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1889 n.4 (2018) (“We do not doubt
that the State may prohibit messages intended to mislead voters about voting requirements and
procedures.”).
62. The limitation to websites with large numbers of users is meant to limit the burden of such
a law on those who are engaged in personal expression without much societal impact.
63. Such a law may not even be subject to strict scrutiny under Alvarez, which leaves uncertain
the level of First Amendment protection that applies to knowing falsehoods. A law that would go
further and prohibit “misleading” campaign speech is more problematic despite Mansky’s reference
to “messages intended to mislead voters about voting requirements and procedures.” Consider a
flyer which was distributed some years ago in University of Wisconsin dormitories telling voters
to vote “at the polling place of your choice.” See HASEN, supra note 3, at 94 (containing an example
of such a flyer). A vote cast anywhere but in the voter’s actual voting place would be a provisional
ballot which would not count. The statement is misleading but it does not contain a falsity, and it
may be impossible to write a law that would allow for this policing without raising a risk of political
censorship. Professor Green argues for a narrower scope for regulation, only those featuring the
names or likenesses of candidates. “Other counterfeits—like a fabricated video of a riot, faked
evidence of a ‘crisis actor’ in a school shooting, or a doctored image of an immigrant toddler—
even if attempting to distort an electoral result, would not be implicated. Counterfeit speech relating
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A law requiring companies to remove such content would be supported by
the same compelling interest the Court implicitly recognized in Mansky: the
protection of the integrity of the voting process. And while such a law would
reach into the private property of websites, it is less intrusive than laws which
prohibit other unprotected speech on private property, such as laws banning
obscenity, and supported by a truly compelling state interest in assuring that
voters have accurate information about how to participate in a democracy. 64
Second, nothing would prevent a government agency from declaring what
is true or false about elections, politics, and policy, and then voters could take
that information for what it is worth: a credible government agency is likely to
be believed, while an agency headed by a charlatan yelling “fake news” would
be less likely to be believed. Under the government speech doctrine, as the
Supreme Court recognized recently in Matal v. Tam, “[w]hen a government
entity embarks on a course of action, it necessarily takes a particular viewpoint
and rejects others. The Free Speech Clause does not require government to
maintain viewpoint neutrality when its officers and employees speak about that
venture.” 65
Third, the government likely has the power under the Constitution to
mandate a truth-in-labeling law requiring social media platforms and other
websites with large numbers of users to deploy the best reasonably available
technology to label synthetic media containing altered video and audio images
as “altered.” The technology to detect the most sophisticated deep fakes is not
there yet, 66 but with the investment of significant resources—which are in the
country’s national security interest to develop quickly 67—adequate means to
ferret out when someone has posted altered media may well be on the way. 68
to policy issues would also be excluded from the proposed prohibition.” Green, supra note 34, at
1451.
64. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (“these areas of speech can,
consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable
content [obscenity, defamation, etc.]”).
65. 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017).
66. Chesney & Citron, supra note 9, at 1787 (expressing skepticism of a technological solution
in the short term); Evan Halper, ‘Deep Fakes’ Video Could Upend an Election—But Silicon Valley
Could Have a Way to Combat Them, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/poli
tics/story/2019-11-05/deep-fakes-2020-election-silicon-valley-cure [https://perma.cc/A9FV-AE
97]. The “best reasonably available technology” standard would have to be developed, perhaps via
Federal Trade Commission regulations, taking into account the cost and efficacy of such
technology. Similarly, regulation would have to specify what counts as an alteration of a video.
The regulation would exclude from those videos requiring the “altered” label those videos which
used commercially ordinary cropping and color correction, for example.
67. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 9, at 1784 (discussing dire national security implications
of deep fakes).
68. Drew Harwell, White House Shares Doctored Video to Support Punishment of Journalist
Jim Acosta, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/11/
08/white-house-shares-doctored-video-support-punishment-journalist-jim-acosta/?utm_term=.60
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As detection technology continues to develop, a truth-in-labeling regime
should be the top way to deal with the deep fake problem and is supported by
the government’s interest in preventing consumer and voter deception. Such
labeling would help solve the market-for-lemons problem, at least with respect
to doctored audio and video. The market for lemons in the used car market arose
because consumers do not have adequate tools to separate good used cars from
lemons. Just like a law that would require sellers of used cars to disclose earlier
problems with a car (akin to “show me the Carfax” 69), a labeling law requiring
social media platforms to label video and audio as altered would help cure the
market failure. Viewers would become more confident that the videos they
observed or audio they heard were genuine and not a “lemon” when the media
arrived into their feed without a label indicating alteration.
Such a truth-in-labeling requirement would be viewpoint neutral, and it
would not enmesh the government or websites in the difficult business of
determining what is legitimate satire. Media altered for satirical purposes, for
example, would be labeled just the same way as that manipulated for malicious
reasons. The labeling will not interfere with any satiric purpose. 70
Nor would such a law run afoul of prohibitions on certain forms of
compelled speech. In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v.

1cddabc808 [https://perma.cc/KA6R-GPU7]. In the meantime, there often will be adequate proof
that a particular audio or video of an elected official, candidate, or other public figure has been
altered, and that the media portrayal is not a truthful representation. One recent such example where
a fraud was quickly uncovered with conventional technology involved CNN reporter Jim Acosta.
As the Washington Post reported:
White House press secretary Sarah Sanders on Wednesday night shared a video of
CNN reporter Jim Acosta that appeared to have been altered to make his actions at a news
conference look more aggressive toward a White House intern.
The edited video looks authentic: Acosta appeared to swiftly chop down on the arm of
an aide as he held onto a microphone while questioning President Trump. But in the original
video, Acosta’s arm appears to move only as a response to a tussle for the microphone. His
statement, “Pardon me, ma’am,” is not included in the video Sanders shared.
Critics said that video—which sped up the movement of Acosta’s arms in a way that
dramatically changed the journalist’s response—was deceptively edited to score political
points. That edited video was first shared by Paul Joseph Watson, known for his conspiracytheory videos on the far-right website Infowars.
Id.
69. Press Release, Carfax, ‘Show Me the Carfax Campaign’ Wins Coveted Effie Award (June
16, 2011), https://www.carfax.com/press/show-me-the-carfax-campaign-wins-coveted-effieaward [https://perma.cc/97LH-846A] (“Carfax and its partner Zimmerman Advertising have
received a Silver Effie Award for the ‘Show Me the Carfax’ national advertising campaign. The
two companies collaborated on the campaign that helps consumers buy used cars with more
confidence and shop at dealerships that provide Carfax Vehicle History Reports for the cars they
sell.”).
70. Such a law could exempt from coverage certain technical minor alterations, such as color
correction of video content.
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Becerra, 71 the Supreme Court struck down two California laws requiring certain
“crisis pregnancy centers” to give notices to clients about the availability of
publicly funded family planning services, including abortion and contraception.
The Court held that such disclosures were a form of compelled speech on a
controversial topic that were not justified under even intermediate scrutiny. It
held that the law was underinclusive in providing information about statesponsored services to low-income women. 72 And it held that California could
have provided the information to California women directly without burdening
the centers. 73
In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court reaffirmed that the
government could mandate “purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures
about commercial products.” 74 It pointed to its earlier decision in Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio 75 upholding an Ohio
law requiring attorneys who advertised contingency fee services to disclose that
clients may have to pay certain fees and costs. 76
The Court described Zauderer as an illustration of the Court applying a
lower level of scrutiny of compelled disclosure in certain contexts, and it
stressed the commercial, factual context of permissible disclosures: “Noting that
the disclosure requirement governed only ‘commercial advertising’ and required
the disclosure of ‘purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms
under which . . . services will be available,’ the Court explained that such
requirements should be upheld unless they are ‘unjustified or unduly
burdensome.’”77 Lower courts have read Zauderer as at least applying to
disclosures aimed at preventing consumer deception, if not going even further
to allow the government to mandate further factual and uncontroversial
disclosures. 78
A requirement that websites and social media platforms with large number
of users label altered videos as “altered” would mandate the disclosure of purely
factual and uncontroversial information in a commercial context. 79 It would not
require the websites to make value judgments about the reasons for the alteration

71. Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018).
72. Id. at 2375–76.
73. Id. at 2376.
74. Id.
75. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 629
(1985).
76. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
77. Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
78. Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 355, 394 & nn.194–95
(2018). See also id. at 380 (reading a line of Supreme Court cases to “suggest[] that perhaps pure
compulsions to convey facts are generally permissible”).
79. That people post on social media for political purposes does not negate the essentially
commercial nature of enterprises such as Facebook and Twitter.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

552

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:535

and it would be something that is objectively verifiable. It would protect
consumers and voters from deception.
My proposal for truth in labeling of deep fakes stands a greater chance of
being held constitutional than laws that would punish deep fakes or require their
removal from websites and social media platforms. For example, a recently
enacted California law (in effect only until January 1, 2023) makes it illegal for
anyone “within 60 days of an election at which a candidate for elective office
will appear on the ballot, [to] distribute, with actual malice, materially deceptive
audio or visual media . . . of the candidate with the intent to injure the
candidate’s reputation or to deceive a voter into voting for or against the
candidate” unless the video or audio was labeled as “manipulated.” 80 The bill
contains exemptions for the news media and for “satire or parody.” 81 The law
allows a candidate injured by a deep fake to obtain an injunction and damages
in appropriate cases. 82
The California law, which was inspired by a crudely altered 2019 video
(sometimes referred to as a “cheap fake” 83) making it appear that House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi was drunk at a press conference, 84 presents greater constitutional
problems both because of its wider breadth and its pejorative labeling.
Among other things, a law banning deep fakes raises vagueness and
overbreadth problems by preventing the use of synthetic media when one is
reckless about distributing “deceptive” video or audio about a candidate to a
voter. It is not clear how to define what counts as “parody or satire” under the
80. Cal. Leg. AB 730 (2019-2020) Regular Session, http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/bill
TextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB730 [https://perma.cc/8QF6-RFG6], amended California
Elections Code Section 20010 until 2023. The quoted language appears in section 20010(a). The
new section 20010(e) defines “deceptive audio or visual media” as
an image or an audio or video recording of a candidate’s appearance, speech, or conduct
that has been intentionally manipulated in a manner such that both of the following
conditions are met:
(1) The image or audio or video recording would falsely appear to a reasonable person to
be authentic.
(2) The image or audio or video recording would cause a reasonable person to have a
fundamentally different understanding or impression of the expressive content of the image
or audio or video recording than that person would have if the person were hearing or seeing
the unaltered, original version of the image or audio or video recording.
Id.
81. Id. § (d)(5).
82. Id. §§ (c)(1), (c)(2).
83. On the difference between deep fakes and cheap fakes, see Dan Patterson, From Deepfake
to “Cheap Fake,” It’s Getting Harder to Tell What’s True on Your Favorite Apps and Websites,
CBS NEWS (June 13, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-are-deepfakes-how-to-tell-ifvideo-is-fake/ [https://perma.cc/3E3D-WZGZ].
84. Andrew Sheeler, California is Moving to Ban Deepfakes. What Are They, Anyway?, THE
SACRAMENTO BEE (July 2, 2019), www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/arti
cle232162032.html [https://perma.cc/F4M5-QH8S].
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law’s safe harbor, and how to tell whether someone who is intending to influence
an election using manipulated media engaged in an act of deception.
Further, the label “manipulated” is more pejorative than “altered,” and that
too may raise a constitutional issue because the government would be putting a
negative label on political speech. In Cook v. Gralike, 85 the Court considered the
constitutionality under the Qualifications Clause of a proposed “Scarlet Letter”
ballot provision requiring state officials to label some congressional candidates
on the ballot as having “disregarded” or “declined” voter instructions on term
limits. The Court rejected the requirement, in part based upon the pejorative
nature of the ballot descriptions: “In describing the two labels, the courts below
have employed terms such as ‘pejorative,’ ‘negative,’ ‘derogatory,’
‘intentionally intimidating,’ ‘particularly harmful,’ ‘politically damaging,’ ‘a
serious sanction,’ ‘a penalty,’ and ‘official denunciation.’” 86
Unlike the California law, a truth-in-labeling requirement is not government
censorship, because it stops no one from being able to create and post whatever
altered video they like. 87 It does not pejoratively label the material as
“manipulated.” It raises no issues of prior restraint of speech as the California
law may raise through the availability of injunctive relief.
Any further actions that platforms may choose to take with synthetic media
would be a private decision for the platform companies and not a requirement of
law. The platforms, acting as private citizens, could choose to remove some or
all altered videos, downgrade them, put them through additional review—or for
that matter promote them however the platform prefers. The Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed in Manhattan Community Access Corporation v. Halleck 88
that even regulated private television broadcasters are private actors, not state
actors bound by the First Amendment. The point is that a truth-in-labeling law
would not require the government to remove any content, and any removal
choices would be private decisions not limited by the First Amendment.
In this way, the deep fakes problem is surprisingly easier to solve (once the
technology is in place) than the problem of low-tech false information. When it
comes to whether video or audio has been manipulated, there is an objective
85. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 513–14 (2001).
86. Id. at 524.
87. At the time this Essay went to press, Twitter began voluntarily experimenting with labeling
altered videos as “manipulated.” Cat Zakrzewski, Twitter Flags Video Retweeted by President
Trump as ‘Manipulated Media,’ WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2020/03/08/twitter-flags-video-retweeted-by-president-trump-manipulated-media/
[https://perma.cc/EMA6-T8CA]. My proposal is also less intrusive than Professor Green’s, which
“would impose criminal sanction for the knowing manufacture of fake images, audio or other
material of an identifiable candidate for public office, published within [a specified number of]
days prior to an election, with intent to deceive voters and distort the electoral process.” Green,
supra note 34, at 1456. She would exempt counterfeit campaign speech clearly labeled as “fake.”
Id. at 1457.
88. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1934 (2019).
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truth of the matter: a scientific comparison of original content with content
posted online. As noted above, it is much harder to use law to deal with false
campaign speech, such as the outrageous claims made in the 2016 election that
Hillary Clinton was a murderer 89 or that Democrats were responsible for the
murder of DNC staffer Seth Rich, a false claim suggested by Wikileaks to take
the heat off the Russians for leaking DNC documents. 90 A law that told
platforms to remove factually false content would be much more difficult to
enforce. Who decides what is true or false, and how? Mandating that platforms
determine truth does not solve the First Amendment problem. For the problem
of “mere” misinformation and not synthetic media, the best hope for now is not
the use of election law but instead public pressure to force private social media
platforms to police it. If the platforms do not respond to pressure, the next lever
might be antitrust law to create smaller companies more responsive to consumer
demand and pressure. 91
IV. CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
Alabama voters looking at Facebook for information about whom to support
in the 2017 special election to replace Jeff Sessions for the United States Senate
may well have come across the “Dry Alabama” website, which was backing
Republican candidate Roy Moore against Democrat Doug Jones. The New York
Times explained that the Facebook page,
illustrated with stark images of car wrecks and videos of families ruined by
drink, had a blunt message: Alcohol is the devil’s work, and the state should ban
it entirely. Along with a companion Twitter feed, the Facebook page appeared
to be the work of Baptist teetotalers who supported the Republican, Roy S.
Moore, in the 2017 Alabama Senate race. “Pray for Roy Moore,” one tweet
exhorted. 92

The teetotalers, however, were not behind the Dry Alabama page on
Facebook and they did not support Moore. Instead, those behind the page
“thought associating Mr. Moore with calls for a statewide alcohol ban would
89. Jeet Heer, Minutes, NEW REPUBLIC (June 27, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/minutes/13
3694/donald-trump-suggests-hillary-clinton-might-murdererand-no-one-bats-eye [https://perma.
cc/W68J-HUJS] (“Donald Trump suggests Hillary Clinton might be a murderer—and no one bats
an eye.”)
90. See MUELLER REPORT, supra note 29, at 48–49.
91. There is a rigorous debate on the question of using antitrust law to break up social media
companies, an issue beyond the scope of this Essay. See Jacob M. Schlesinger, Brent Kendall, &
John D. McKinnon, Tech Giants Google, Facebook and Amazon Intensify Antitrust Debate, WALL
ST. J. (June 12, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tech-giants-google-facebook-and-amazonintensify-antitrust-debate-11559966461 [https://perma.cc/4T3U-4MVP].
92. Scott Shane & Alan Blinder, Democrats Faked Online Push to Outlaw Alcohol in Alabama
Race, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/07/us/politics/alabama-senate
-facebook-roy-moore.html [https://perma.cc/LAV4-7DND].
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hurt him with moderate, business-oriented Republicans and assist the Democrat,
Doug Jones, who won the special election by a hair-thin margin.” 93
Nor were the scores of purportedly Russian bots with their Cyrillic names
and symbols popping up on Twitter and supporting Roy Moore during the
campaign actually from Russia. Instead, in a story I tell in greater detail
elsewhere, 94 a liberal group supporting Jones, working independently and
apparently without his knowledge, engaged in a concentrated social media
campaign to flip the votes of moderate Republicans, or at least get them to stay
home and not vote at all in the normally deep red state. This was an unusual
Democratic voter suppression effort in a red state aimed at white Republicans.
“Project Alabama” was funded by billionaire LinkedIn cofounder, Reid
Hoffman, through an outfit called American Engagement Technologies. 95 Some
of the political operation’s activities disseminated misinformation, but others
involved circulation of truthful information or non-factual opinion, where the
real chicanery was not in the content of the message but in lying about or
obscuring the identity of the speaker. 96 Alabama voters deciding who to vote for
might well have cared that progressive Democrats, and not teetotalers or
Russians, were the ones trying to influence who they voted for and how.
But information about the source of the influence campaign was not
available to voters when they voted. It came to light only after the election
through leaks to the New York Times 97 and Washington Post. 98 Without those
leaks, we still might not know of these efforts, just like we only learned of some
of the Russian activity aimed at sowing social discord swinging the election to
Donald Trump thanks to the work of American intelligence agencies and the
prosecutors who produced the Mueller report.
Campaign finance disclosure law has long been concerned with making sure
busy voters have the information they need to make informed decisions. Social
93. Id.
94. RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION MELTDOWN: DIRTY TRICKS, DISTRUST, AND THREAT TO
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 75–80 (2020).
95. Id. at 78–79.
96. Id. at 75–76.
97. Scott Shane & Alan Blinder, Secret Experiment in Alabama Senate Race Imitated Russian
Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/alabama-senate-roy
-jones-russia.html [https://perma.cc/8WNA-LHXW]; Scott Shane, Alan Blinder, & Sydney Ember,
Doug Jones “Outraged” by Russian-Style Tactics Used in His Senate Race, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/us/politics/doug-jones-social-media.html [https://per
ma.cc/KEE6-N8A8].
98. Craig Timberg, Tony Romm, Aaron C. Davis, & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Secret Campaign to
Use Russian-Inspired Tactics in 2017 Ala. Election Stirs Anxiety for Democrats, WASH. POST (Jan.
6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/secret-campaign-to-use-russianinspired-tactics-in-2017-alabama-election-stirs-anxiety-for-democrats/2019/01/06/58803f26-040
0-11e9-8186-4ec26a485713_story.html?utm_term=.86cbec124752
[https://perma.cc/73SB-A7
PS].
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science demonstrates that voters use shortcuts to make decisions, and one
reliable piece of information voters rely upon is who is behind an election
message aimed at them. 99 For example, in 2010, California voters turned down
a ballot proposition that would have benefited Pacific Gas and Electric
(“PG&E”). PG&E provided almost all of the $46 million to the “Yes on 16”
campaign, compared with very little spent opposing the measure. “Thanks to
California’s disclosure laws, PG&E’s name appeared on every ‘Yes on 16’ ad,
and the measure narrowly went down to defeat.” 100
The Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo 101 recognized that campaign finance
disclosure laws may serve this information interest, as well as interests in
preventing the corruption of elected officials, by allowing voters to follow the
money and look for special treatment given to campaign donors or those who
spend to favor or oppose candidates, and the enforcement interest, ensuring that
no other campaign finance laws are broken. For example, it is illegal for foreign
governments, other foreign entities, and most noncitizens (except green card
holders residing in the United States) to spend money on American candidate
campaigns, 102 and adequate disclosure allows regulators, the press, and the
public to ensure that prohibited foreign sources are not secretly participating in
our elections.
Our current campaign finance disclosure laws are not up to the task of
ferreting out the true sources of new social media campaigns aimed at trying to
influence opinions in elections, such as the activities of the Russians in 2016 or
the pro-Jones forces in Alabama in 2017.
Roughly speaking, federal campaign finance disclosure law requires the
disclosure of spending by persons or entities who engage in express advocacy,
such as an advertisement directly urging a vote for or against a candidate. 103 The
law also requires disclosure of some advertising appearing on television or radio
which mentions or features a candidate in a small time window before the
election. 104 Candidates, political parties, and campaign committees also have to
disclose their election-related spending. 105 Courts have split over whether
political organizations that have as a major purpose the election or defeat of

99. Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure
Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295 (2005).
100. For more details on PG& E example, see Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense
of Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J. L. & POL. 557, 570 (2012).
101. 424 U.S. at 66–68.
102. 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2019); 11 C.F.R. § 110.20 (2019).
103. Id. § 30101(9)(A). See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52 (defining express advocacy).
104. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(1) (2019).
105. 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101(9)(A), 30104 (2019).
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candidates may constitutionally be compelled to disclose their expenses as
well. 106
Unfortunately, these rules leave open a great deal of important campaign
activity for which there is no compelled disclosure, making it impossible for law
to fulfill its information, anticorruption, and enforcement purposes. 107 Most of
the paid social media advertising that the Russians engaged in did not contain
express advocacy. It likely would surprise non-specialists in the area, but
spending money on online advertising saying “Hillary Clinton is a Satan!,” as
Russian operatives did in 2016, 108 is not considered campaign activity under
federal campaign finance rules. And unless “Dry Alabama” registered as a
political action committee, it too likely would have been able to avoid disclosing
who paid for its activities unless it engaged in express advocacy. “Pray for Roy
Moore” is not express advocacy.
Campaign finance disclosure laws should be updated to deal with the
changing campaign landscape, and in particular to deal with the use of social
media and artificial intelligence to influence elections.
First, Congress should extend the same rules that apply to television and
radio advertisements to advertising distributed online, including via social
media. Years ago, I was among those arguing that the Federal Election
Commission’s failure to extend the rules to the online space would leave one of
the most important arenas for campaigning unregulated and without adequate
disclosure. 109 But libertarian opposition to any regulation related to campaigns
and the Internet has successfully beat back most efforts to extend the rules for
almost two decades as the use of new technologies for campaigning has
exploded. 110 Had those nascent efforts succeeded, those who spend significant
sums seeking to support or oppose candidates for office and who mention
candidates’ names or feature their likenesses in online content would have had
to comply with disclosure rules. Today, with so much campaign and political
106. Zachary R. Clark, Comment, Constitutional Limits on State Campaign Finance Disclosure
Laws: What’s the Purpose of the Major Purpose Test?, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 527 (2015).
107. See Hasen, Cheap Speech, supra note 8, at 219 n.84 (describing narrow reach of foreign
spending ban according to court decision in Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d
281, 292, aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012)).
108. See the indictment filed by Special Counsel Robert Mueller, Feb. 16, 2018, at page 20,
https://www.justice.gov/file/1035477/download [https://perma.cc/3T8R-U2U3], for the “Hillary is
a Satan!” example.
109. Richard L. Hasen, The Ripple Effects of the FEC’s Rules on Political Blogging:
Why They Will End Up Undermining Limits on Corporation and Union Campaign Finance
Activities, FINDLAW (Apr. 5, 2005), https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/the-ripple-ef
fects-of-the-fecs-rules-on-political-blogging.html [https://perma.cc/3WLA-9A7T].
110. Ashley Balcerzak, Federal Officials Struggle to Drag Political Rules into the Internet Age,
CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (June 27, 2018) (corrected Oct. 26, 2018), https://publicintegrity.org/
federal-politics/federal-officials-struggle-to-drag-political-ad-rules-into-the-internet-age/
[https://perma.cc/7QJZ-UP6F].
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activity moving online, there is no good argument that government regulation
which is generally applicable to campaign activity should not apply to online
campaign activity. The world is topsy-turvy when online political activity
requires the least disclosure but needs it the most.
The proposed Honest Ads Act 111 would close the loophole for traditional
campaigns ads disseminated over social media and the Internet, but simply
bringing the McCain-Feingold era disclosure laws on “electioneering
communications” to social media will not be enough to deal with cutting-edge
methods of influence. Today, campaigns and others use data harvested from a
voter’s online activity to target ads aimed at that voter’s views and interests. 112
View the Audubon Society website? You might be hit with an advertisement
criticizing or praising a candidate’s environmental record.
Such microtargeting, which gained popularity in 2016, is no longer the
cutting edge of campaign persuasion techniques. Already campaigns are
experimenting with programmable non-human “bots” that send direct messages
to users and engage in political conversations with these users in an effort to
influence their voter choice. As Noam Cohen explained,
When they were invented, back in the nineteen-sixties, they weren’t capable of
manipulating their users. Most bot creators worked in university labs and didn’t
conjure these programs to exploit the public. Today’s bots have been designed
to achieve specific goals by appearing human and blending into the cacophony
of online voices. Many have been commercialized or politicized. In the 2016
Presidential campaign, bots were created to support both Donald Trump and
Hillary Clinton, but pro-Trump bots outnumbered pro-Clinton ones five to one,
by one estimate, and many were dispatched by Russian intermediaries. 113

Already California has passed a law to ban the practice of using anonymous
bots. 114 And it is impossible to know what technological innovations will next
be harvested for campaign purposes.

111. S. 1356, 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1
356/text [https://perma.cc/Z64G-GV2Y].
112. On the use of and concerns about campaigns engaging in microtargeting, see Persily, supra
note 27, at 21–23.
113. Noam Cohen, Will California’s New Bot Law Strengthen Democracy?, THE NEW YORKER
(July 2, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/will-californias-new-botlaw-strengthen-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/X9FS-277E].
114. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17941(a) (2018) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to use a
bot to communicate or interact with another person in California online, with the intent to mislead
the other person about its artificial identity for the purpose of knowingly deceiving the person about
the content of the communication in order to incentivize a purchase or sale of goods or services in
a commercial transaction or to influence a vote in an election. A person using a bot shall not be
liable under this section if the person discloses that it is a bot.”); Steven Musil, California Bans
Bots Secretly Trying to Sway Elections, CNET (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/
california-bans-bots-secretly-trying-to-sway-elections/ [https://perma.cc/J7GT-PBU2].
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Second, modern campaign finance disclosure law should be updated so that
it requires the disclosure of the funders behind coordinated and well-funded
attempts to influence elections via social media, even if the attempted persuasion
comes in the form of bot-generated private messages lacking express advocacy.
The best estimate is that Russia spent around $100,000 on Facebook advertising
aimed to influence the 2016 elections, 115 out of billions spent during those
elections, and the threshold for disclosure should be set low enough to capture
this level of spending.
An updated disclosure law should require that any person or entity who
spends over a certain threshold on using social media resources to directly or
indirectly influence voters to vote for or against a particular candidate or ballot
measure must disclose the amount of their activities and their ultimate source of
funding to the government via an online report. And to the extent technologically
practicable, 116 the message itself should provide an easy basis, such as the
clicking of a link, to determine the identity of the sender (as well as further
information about funding).
The spending threshold for mandated disclosure would count not only the
funds paid to the platforms for paid services but also expenditures using software
engineers, consultants, or others in an effort to influence elections via social
media. 117 Those who fall within the reporting threshold would have to certify
under penalty of perjury to the website or social media platform they wish to use
that they have made the required disclosures to the government before they may
use social media resources on the platform. The law would exempt those who
can credibly demonstrate that they would face the threat of harassment if their
identities were disclosed 118 and media corporations when they are engaged in
journalistic enterprises. 119
115. Scott Shane & Vindu Goel, Fake Russian Facebook Accounts Bought $100,000 in
Political Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/technology/face
book-russian-political-ads.html [https://perma.cc/4SMK-ZYEB].
116. But cf. 11 C.F.R. § 110.11(f)(1) (exempting from disclosure “(i) Bumper stickers, pins,
buttons, pens, and similar small items upon which the disclaimer cannot be conveniently printed
[and] (ii) Skywriting, water towers, wearing apparel, or other means of displaying an advertisement
of such a nature that the inclusion of a disclaimer would be impracticable”).
117. The law would not cover unpaid, non-targeted social media posts, such as that of an
individual expressing support or opposition to a candidate.
118. See Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982). The Federal
Election Commission has long determined when groups are entitled to such an exemption. See, e.g.,
Federal Election Commission, Advisory Op. 2016-23 (granting renewed partial disclosure
exemption for Socialist Workers Party), https://www.fec.gov/updates/advisory-opinion-request2016-23-socialist-workers-party/ [https://perma.cc/W6DT-5D48].
119. This of course raises the question of who counts as a journalist in the Internet and social
media age. I address this question in detail in RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED:
CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 124–
45 (2016). My bottom line is to piggyback on a definition of journalism put forward by Professor
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No doubt, opponents of an enhanced social media disclosure law would
argue that such a law violates the First Amendment. I believe there are strong
arguments in favor of the constitutionality of this disclosure under current
Supreme Court doctrine, although I am concerned about the direction that the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area may go.
Since the 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo 120 and through the 2010 case,
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 121 the Supreme Court has
applied “exacting scrutiny” and upheld most disclosure laws challenged under
the First Amendment. These laws do not prohibit any speech, but rather allow
voters to know who is paying to influence their political decisions. They are a
more narrowly tailored approach to the issue of money in politics than limits or
bans on spending. With an exemption for those demonstrating the threat of
harassment, disclosure laws generally pass constitutional muster.
Although there have been twists and turns that I have covered elsewhere, 122
the Court has repeatedly held that the government’s anticorruption, information,
and its enforcement interests can justify generally applicable campaign finance
disclosure laws, even if they are targeted at very small contributions. Such laws
are constitutional so long as they contain an exemption for those who may
demonstrate a realistic threat of harassment.
Federal election law requires disclosure of certain expenditures, and defines
an expenditure to include “any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance,
deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by any person for the
purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.” 123 Current Federal
Election Commission regulations exempt certain Internet-based activities from
regulation. 124 The federal statute and these regulations should be rewritten to
ensure disclosure above a certain dollar threshold on Internet and social media
efforts undertaken for the purpose of influencing federal elections. Disclosure
should no longer be limited to those who spend money on express advocacy or
who engage in electioneering communications.
The question is how to write a law or regulation defining what counts as
spending “for the purpose of influencing federal elections” without running
afoul of vagueness and chilling problems under the First Amendment. 125
Fortunately, when it comes to disclosure, the Supreme Court has held that the
Sonja J. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2456 (2014), and described on page
140 of my book.
120. 424 U.S. at 16–18.
121. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. at 366–71.
122. See Hasen, supra note 100, and Hasen, infra note 130.
123. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(A)(i) (2012) (emphasis added).
124. 11 C.F.R. § 100.155 (2019).
125. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(A)(i) (2012). See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, 551
U.S. 449 (2007) (rejecting under the First Amendment a test for barring nonprofit corporate express
advocacy because it required too great an inquiry into the speakers’ intent).
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government may require disclosure of spending on political activity that goes
well beyond express advocacy for elections. Thus, in the 1954 case of United
States v. Harriss, 126 the Supreme Court upheld a law mandating the disclosure
of certain lobbying activities. In the 1978 case, First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 127 the Court upheld campaign finance disclosure requirements
applicable to ballot measure campaigns, with no involvement of candidates.
Further, in Citizens United, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that
the government could only require disclosure of spending on express advocacy
and its functional equivalent. 128 And in a portion of the earlier McConnell case
not overruled by Citizens United, the Court upheld Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act Section 504’s broad “issue request” requirement, requiring broadcasters to
keep records of requests made by anyone to broadcast “message[s]” related to a
“national legislative issue of public importance” or “otherwise relating to a
political matter of national importance.” 129 Writing for a Court majority on this
point, Justice Breyer’s opinion
explained a number of purposes served by the section 504 recordkeeping
requirements, including that “recordkeeping can help both the regulatory
agencies and the public evaluate broadcast fairness, and determine the amount
of money that individuals or groups, supporters or opponents, intend to spend to
help elect a particular candidate.” He recognized that the “issue request”
requirements could impose an administrative burden, and left open the
possibility of a challenge to FCC implementing regulations in the future. 130

Given these precedents, a law targeted at the disclosure of social media
expenditures made with a purpose of influencing federal elections should pass
constitutional muster, even if it reaches more broadly than express advocacy, for
example to cover large spending on political issues related to the election by
groups such as those aligned with the Tea Party Movement or Black Lives
Matter. The disclosure rule should rely on clear factors for determining what
counts as election-related spending subject to disclosure, tied to both content and
timing, modeled after the clarity of FEC rules determining what counts as a
“coordinated communication.” 131 Clear rules avoid the potential for vagueness
and administrative and prosecutorial discretion in the application of these rules.
Although I am confident of the constitutionality of such a measure under
existing Supreme Court doctrine, the Court’s jurisprudence on disclosure will
not necessarily remain static. Justices Anthony Kennedy and Antonin Scalia
126. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
127. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
128. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 368–69.
129. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 238–40.
130. Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Easy Case for Disclosure of Contributions and
Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 3 ELECTION L.J. 251–55 (2004) (citations omitted,
quoting McConnell).
131. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c), (d).
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were great proponents among conservatives of the value of campaign disclosure
laws, 132 but they no longer are on the Court. Justice Clarence Thomas has long
held the view that there is a general right to anonymity when engaging in
campaign activity, 133 a view the Court flirted with in a 1995 case called McIntyre
v. Ohio Election Commission 134 but later all but abandoned. Further, in Doe v.
Reed, 135 both Justices Thomas 136 and Samuel Alito 137 expressed concern about
the greater potential for harassment of campaign donors given the ease with
which information about contributors and spenders flows on the Internet, an
issue which seems in recent years to have broken along ideological lines, with
conservatives expressing greater concern about harassment. These views could
well attract the support of the newest Justices, Neil Gorsuch and Brett
Kavanaugh, leaving Chief Justice Roberts in the middle.
In short, my proposed disclosure law is likely constitutional under current
doctrine (with the longer-term future less certain). Such a law could help voters
obtain valuable information about who is trying to influence their votes. It could
also help with the enforcement interest by making sure that prohibited foreign
sources are not engaged in illegal activities to influence our elections. 138 And it
is likely to be much more effective than private efforts to require disclosure.
Facebook’s efforts have been both overinclusive, including journalists who
should be exempt from disclosure, 139 and underinclusive, by allowing people to
hide their true identities behind other persons or entities, such as Vice News’s
successful efforts to pretend to be all 100 U.S. Senators and to post ads in their
name. 140

132. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 228 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Requiring people to stand
up in public for their political acts fosters civic courage, without which democracy is doomed. For
my part, I do not look forward to a society which, thanks to the Supreme Court, campaigns
anonymously and even exercises the direct democracy of initiative and referendum hidden from
public scrutiny and protected from the accountability of criticism. This does not resemble the Home
of the Brave.”); Citizens United, 338 U.S. at 371 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (“The First
Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to
the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the electorate to make
informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”).
133. McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 358 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
134. Id.
135. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010).
136. Id. at 229 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 202 (Alito, J., concurring).
138. On the need to rewrite the ban on foreign spending in U.S. elections to be more effective,
and potential constitutional issues, see Hasen, Cheap Speech, supra note 8, at 216–26.
139. Jeremy B. Merrill and Ariana Tobin, Facebook’s Screening for Political Ads Nabs News
Sites Instead of Politicians, PROPUBLICA (June 15, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/face
book-new-screening-system-flags-the-wrong-ads-as-political [https://perma.cc/T3FM-TML9].
140. William Turton, We Posed as 100 Senators to Run Ads on Facebook. Facebook Approved
All of Them, VICE NEWS (Oct. 30, 2018), https://news.vice.com/en_ca/article/xw9n3q/we-posed-
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The law would not be perfect. Efforts to sow discord, for example, by
organizing pro- and anti-Muslim rallies on facing street corners as Russian
govern operatives did in the 2016 elections, 141 might be revealed only if a social
media platform looked closely enough at the activities, flagged the spenders as
engaging in these activities for the purpose of influencing U.S. elections, and
excluded them for not filling a certification. But to the extent actors would use
social media platforms for campaign purposes, the certification requirement will
create the right legal incentives for the platforms to look for such activity and
improve disclosure.
V. VOTING RIGHTS AND SILOED JUSTICES 142
In an eye-opening 2013 interview with journalist Jennifer Senior, the late
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia explained his “media diet.” 143 He said
that he read the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Times. 144 He had
dropped his subscription to the Washington Post because of what he saw as the
newspaper’s “treatment of almost any conservative issue. It was slanted and
often nasty. And, you know, why should I get upset every morning? I don’t think
I’m the only one. I think they lost subscriptions partly because they became so
shrilly, shrilly liberal.” 145 He also said he did not read the New York Times and
that he got most of his news from talk radio. 146
Scalia’s media diet was a sign of things to come, and raises perhaps the most
difficult issue for election law in the post-truth era: how should we deal with
judges and Supreme Court justices who cannot agree on basic facts about the
state of the political world?

as-100-senators-to-run-ads-on-facebook-facebook-approved-all-of-them [https://perma.cc/4PXFCFHX].
141. Ryan Lucas, How Russia Used Facebook to Organize Two Sets of Protesters, NPR (Nov.
1, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/01/561427876/how-russia-used-facebook-to-organize-two
-sets-of-protesters [https://perma.cc/F8YK-WQG9]; MUELLER REPORT, supra note 29, at 29–32
(describing Russian military operations to organize rallies of Americans in the United States during
the 2016 election).
142. This section draws from a post at the Balkinization blog, Richard L. Hasen, Siloed Justices
and the Law/Politics Divide, BALKINIZATION (Apr. 2, 2019), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/04/
siloed-justices-and-lawpolitics-divide.html [https://perma.cc/8FGY-2P3Z], in a symposium on the
book, NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN DIVISIONS
CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (2019).
143. Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 6, 2013),
http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/index.html [https://perma.cc/6RVJ-PR
PW].
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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In their recent book on Supreme Court decision-making, 147 Neal Devins and
Larry Baum argue that the two leading political science models of Supreme
Court judicial decision-making—the attitudinalist model positing that Justices
vote their values and the strategic model positing that Justices vote strategically
to advance their values in light of the potential reactions of other strategic actors,
such as Congress and executive agencies—inadequately describe the Justices’
decision-making. They instead offer a psychological model positing that
Justices, like others, are the product of the world around them, and Supreme
Court Justices traveling in elite social circles seek affirmation and approval from
these elites.
As the authors tell it, in an earlier era, a common social circle of other
judges, law professors, lawyers at the top of the profession, and journalists at
elite news outlets helped shape the Justices’ values and occasionally rein in their
votes, and that given an historic liberal bent of the legal elite (at least on civil
rights and civil liberties issues), many Justices “evolved” over time toward the
left on these issues. 148 The authors wrote of the so-called “Greenhouse effect”
where even some conservative Justices were swayed by coverage of the Court
and its decisions by the New York Times’s former Supreme Court reporter, Linda
Greenhouse. 149
But polarization has changed everything on the Supreme Court. Thanks to
polarization in Congress and the Presidency, for the first time in Supreme Court
history all of the conservative-leaning Justices have been appointed by
Presidents of one party and all the liberal-leaning Justices appointed by
Presidents of the other party. 150 The most conservative Democratic-appointed
Justice is more liberal than the most liberal Republican-appointed Justice. 151
Today’s politically polarized elite world both shapes and reflects how
Justices view their jobs and decide how to vote, leading to a new polarization on
the Supreme Court. Adam Bonica and Maya Sen’s work 152 confirms that the
leftward drift of lawyers overall is accelerating, giving plenty of affirmation for
the liberal Justices on the Court. At the same time, the ascendancy of
conservatives and libertarians in the Federalist Society has created an alternative
set of elite actors to whom conservative Justices on the Supreme Court can look
for ideas, law clerks, and social affirmation. 153 Lower court judges brought up
147. DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 142.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Richard L. Hasen, Polarization and the Judiciary, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261 (2019).
151. Id.
152. Adam Bonica & Maya Sen, Judicial Reform as a Tug of War: How Ideological Differences
Between Politicians and the Bar Explain Attempts at Judicial Reform, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1781
(2017).
153. See AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY
AND THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION (2015).
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from Federalist Society ranks appointed by Republican Presidents frequently
advance theories which the (liberal-leaning) legal elite would have considered
“off the wall” in an earlier era, 154 and reinforce one another as to the legitimacy
of these new views.
This divide means fewer “evolving” Justices and greater division on the
Court over time, with social and political issues from abortion to voting rights
to the environment increasingly likely to follow the predictable lines one would
expect if the Justices were voting their political and ideological orientations.
Ironically, the attitudinalist model will increasingly look right because the
Justices can more fully vote their values with knowledge of affirmation from
their reflective social circles.
Devins and Baum have successfully captured the real phenomenon of
polarization on the Supreme Court, even as the Court in its less ideological
moments has achieved high rates of unanimity when the Court deals with
enforcing uniformity of decision-making in the lower courts on non-ideological
questions. 155 When it is an issue that makes it to the front of the New York Times,
the Justices will frequently now divide by ideology and party.
The divide has been accelerated by the rise of the “Celebrity Justice,” 156 a
phenomenon exacerbated by social media. Justice Antonin Scalia, and later Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, became rock star Justices, drawing adoring crowds who
celebrate these lawyers as though they were teenagers meeting Beyoncé. 157 If
we are thinking about the psychological effects on Justices getting affirmation
that they are on the right path, cult-like worship can only make the assured even
surer in their convictions. This seems especially dangerous during polarized
times.
This moment of polarization could not come at a worse time. We are
experiencing rapid technological change in which social media amplifies and
reinforces existing ideas, and where people get exposed to information from
increasingly siloed sources. 158 The Justices are not going to be immune from this
phenomenon.
So imagine a Federalist Society-oriented Justice getting bombarded at home
and in the car and while listening to podcasts at the gym with talk of a scourge
154. Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went
Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/
06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/
[https://perma.cc/HLX2-PMF4].
155. Hasen, supra note 150, at 267–68 (tracking rates of unanimous and one-vote-margin cases
at the Supreme Court).
156. Richard L. Hasen, Celebrity Justice: Supreme Court Edition, 19 GREEN BAG 2D 157
(2016).
157. Id.
158. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 9, at 1765, 1768 (describing literature on “filter
bubbles” and how social media exacerbates problem of receiving one-side information).
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of “voter fraud” via FOX News, Breitbart, and Twitter, while a liberal Justice
hears constant messages about the “myth of voter fraud” and attempts at voter
suppression from the New York Times, MSNBC, and the like.
The Justices live in the real, and polarized, contemporary United States. It
is worth a pause to note that one of the Justices’ spouses frequently touts
unsupported voter fraud claims on social media and considered actions at polling
places aimed at stopping purported non-citizen voter fraud. 159 This certainly
must affect this Justice’s world views of the facts at issue.
When a case makes its way to the Supreme Court involving a restrictive
voting law, the Justices come from their silos with different prior beliefs based
upon how news has been presented to them, along with a set of legal precedents
and presumptions which reinforce their own world views.
Facts should matter to these Justices, as facts always should matter when
courts decide cases of social and political importance. But in an increasingly
post-fact society, where political tribalism rules and is amplified by social
media, and Justices are the product of the world around them, what hope do we
have for reasoned deliberation and rational decision-making? Very little, as the
already frayed line between law and politics stands ready to collapse.
CONCLUSION
The convergence of technology and hyperpolarization raise new risks to our
democracy. I have tried to demonstrate that election law can help in some
regards, such as through improved campaign truth-in-labeling requirements to
deal with deep fakes and with improved campaign finance disclosure laws. Both
types of laws would help voters become more informed in making campaign
choices and give them a better sense of who is trying to sway their opinion, and
how. And they could do so without interfering with robust political campaigns
required by the First Amendment and desirable for an advanced democracy.
But the law can only do so much. As society divides on fundamental
questions of truth, it becomes harder for everyone, including judges, to make
rational decisions and accept data coming from outside informational cocoons.
On this point, there seems little that can be done to prevent such divides, other
than trying to pick the most open-minded judges possible.
I end this exploration of American election law in a post-truth world by
briefly mentioning an even larger issue, raising the final question I noted at the
beginning of this essay: Will voters on the losing end of a close election trust
vote totals and election results announced by election officials when voters are

159. Tierney Sneed, SCOTUS Wife Ginni Thomas Floated Anti-Fraud Campaign for
‘Questionable’ Precincts, TALKING POINTS MEMO (May 18, 2019), https://talkingpointsmemo.
com/muckraker/virginia-thomas-scotus-christian-adams-voter-fraud-campaign [https://perma.cc/
GM9G-JMHH].
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bombarded with conspiracy theories about the reliability of voting technology
and when foreign adversaries target voting systems to undermine confidence?
I have devoted an entire book to this topic, 160 and, to cut to the chase, I am
not optimistic. Democracies depend upon election losers accepting election
results and believing that the vote totals announced by election officials
accurately represent the reality of the situation: that the winner of the election
got more votes than the loser, or at least appeared to do so given the state of our
election system.
Election scholars’ primary task should be to think about how to update
election laws and procedures in the post-truth era to assure continued peaceful
transitions of power. People are going to be skeptical, especially when they are
on the losing end of elections. Transparency and clarity are the best tools to build
into law and into election processes. Transparency and clarity will not convince
all skeptics. But in their absence, the volatile combination of hyperpolarization
and social media wildfires threatens the bedrock of democracy itself: confidence
in free and fair elections.
We owe future generations our best efforts to craft election laws recognizing
the challenges that profound technological change during a period of
hyperpolarization pose for our great democracy.

160. HASEN, supra note 94.
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